

11:05 PM  
12-18-15

She + LBO were right not to  
roll-back military (y, Chin)  
even with uprising

or if local arms had  
failed: ~~a~~ we were

Any more than we should  
have attacked ~~the~~ them because of  
fms:

|| (Munich / Czech: a different  
story! That was a mistake —  
if you saw Hitler as Hitler,  
unappeasable

Was Stalin unappeasable? No!

Not his successors!

But we didn't try negotiations,  
any more than we could have with  
Hitler (not at all)

cf.  
"UNDETERRED"!

Now Potentially fatal mistake!

(\*)

to Putin unappeasable —

short of Hitler 2) USSR

(b) Warsaw Pact; c) giving him M.E.?

A y: YES

(\*)

(IS US appeasable: short of control of M.E.?)



Size at each thread Interval  
the other canal

MAD most biting holes

Not fighter Wf and ~~Wf~~ ~~Wf~~  
Wf and MAD and getting elaborated?

Then - Nether

Wf rises off Scott's shoulders

Disruption - new

no ~~total~~ retail.

no ~~total~~ looks

warriors being provided with and for other

from 1st of War most Oct. 24, 1973 - Holiday

And volume in street. And ~~disruption~~

Having supra strike US & V

2 weeks later US ~~had~~ ~~disruption~~

Disruption ~~disruption~~, ~~disruption~~ ~~disruption~~

OUTL

note to.

2 ~~disruption~~ in a battle ~~disruption~~ ~~disruption~~ ~~disruption~~  
have no ~~disruption~~ ~~disruption~~ ~~disruption~~ ~~disruption~~ ~~disruption~~

either 2 disruption disruption disruption

Disruption disruption disruption -

new strategy ~~disruption~~ ~~disruption~~ ~~disruption~~ no ~~disruption~~



at

monument for justice: justice is or justice  
was used for us

~~that~~ Horn

staying one more

my name went on & on

not to brighten the other but to assume more  
since there is not reason to attack —

other could attack during it

— MAD [not accepted]

det: existing to destroy it is a contradiction (?)

no MAD

{ See rules off law law law  
could point any what  
new text: description

(No)

SU + US

spoon

(Ultimate instability :)

ME

Who? 53:24 worldwide

ME more people

Amazons 3000 years ago

Wing Get 6, 1973

Egypt attack

hairs in

Oct 24 9:35 PM



Bygone alone + drink odds (unknown to others)

if you find the  
parade

10:45 pm <sup>HAK</sup> into Sabes, Colley, H'g VS  
later + low air

2 hrs

11:41 PM

from 5 to 3

B-52s now to land: Wines

large crowds

was told to start investigations

HAK

collection

need more in dispatch

too depressed

drink referred to come down

too fast over persons on field didn't

move to 3 - secret

from public

comes out 5:40

no less than others to the point

about obstructed: Did not total

HAK ambiguity

a deliberate over-reaction



fuller JFK + some new threats

Nov 9, 1979 lty conduct broke up the birds

8:50 AM

3 min full-scale

noon rights - no winners

no confins at Oakes

CP taper at Oakes

R-52 heard by tony

Figures scrambled

WW with back  
begin

LOW

Blain

3-4 mi after

4-5-10 for Pm decision

5 min to total

very much tightly packed

no time for natural thought

nois-fall noted with a wobble

false alarm

most as

Center west end notional (1)

Bruce Brown was worried.

I took to me for training.

I tried to suppress noise - heard the  
guy who missed the tape, but - on point's had  
been told



NORAD known ~~as~~ ~~being~~ to a forward  
base

Browns: "Of this is what it means to  
be protected of you counterpart.

is

like! 007

callously quickly ~~solipsistic~~ ~~unintentional~~ ~~being~~

In 1980, R decided to close the window of vulnerability  
Cannell: no window

[ICBM]

(We had MIRV

88-20 brand  
(140)

Europe ~~became~~ sub ~~hostage~~

to SU was ~~hostage~~

1200 miles in 6 weeks

leading edge ~~sharper~~

before COW

There was in Europe - the unbelievable

aggressive ~~reflexes~~ ~~of an~~ ~~evil~~  
empire

SU suffered from a paranoid (?) ~~stern~~ in ~~EU~~

thinking. 2 weeks later SDI

With SDI

We would destroy Europe, ~~start~~ ~~so~~ ~~west~~.

US would be ~~with~~.



You have to report something - make it out.

UK warned the CIA that SU believed  
US was coming:

the Soviet. 1,

warning to brace for attack.

US procedures

SU plan for attack was to use cover  
for attack.

Rockin' would go silent

warning for launch command  
with hand - plane

New 3: low bomber on alert at Berlin

---

25th Jan 1995 Waltham Rocket

Each sub could up to 24 cities.

US subs continued to be in SU areas.

First two days on about bad March  
the briefing. SS-18 - launch of 10  
would wipe out NY.



?

5 years before Wall came.

1991 SU traps her

Xmas - no SU

last production planned 9

next upshot

sub-stopped patches in C

Blair

hit a deer. The dog was

re-targeting

an accident R launch

to an American target.

David Reed. Pentagon: 4

General Staff can bypass all

chain - to 700 minutes

Man can destroy

in one hour.

Boris Yeltsin have got

Yeltsin close to us

[ But on

9 months: 1

drinking problem.

But the missile

are testing our



$I \equiv$  up shot cannot / ~~up~~ move away -  
to service Pres! slow in down

24,000 warblers 1997

not being paid.

Here laminae breaking down - web clips  
break down, if are not replaced.

[merrier standoff. Each man had too much  
to lose.]

8 water  $[N]^+$

Every winter is 30,00 yams long wester  
less

Models of US + SO will be followed as models  
 Canada <sup>base</sup> in belief that lengthy weight will in CW  
 Most certainly event will occur

[No other answer]

no FO threats I pick

1967...

(no Berlin, Germany)

Prod.



7

5 years before Wall came.

1991 SU traps for

Xmas - no SU

last production planned 95%

went up and

sub-stopped production in Arvin works

Blair - hit a down. The day went on.

re-targeting

An accident R launch would result  
to an Arvin target.

Don't know. Pentagon: the DM

General Staff can bypass all rules -  
can - to 700 miles

Man can do it [would?] (No)  
in one hour.

Boris Yeltsin have quite worried  
Yeltsin close to visit & see

[ But on 9 minutes: 1 hour, with a  
drinking problem.

But the minute was moving on

away

Yeltsin: someone testing our defense program

NO:

refused



Dec. 6, 2013 8:30 AM (DC)

~~But~~ Cold War:

There was <sup>no</sup> reason to expect SU  
invasion of West Europe  
(SU any longer destabilized - ~~not~~ disoriented)

yes, Stalin a tyrant, monstrous, paranoid  
yes, Iron Curtain

[Fear of Germany - with reason!]

But: West Germany

German Movement

Wile invasion of Korea  
SU blunder?

[Wf blockade in '48?

Arise at...?

(Wf Allied determination to

NSC-68: awful (Nite: CPO's

But in building up SU-SAC: K was bluffing

US was not: Really ~~forwards~~ possible FS!

(Kerry/Power: hope!

(Candulaga Rice!)

Did any know, even?!

Any SU plans for prompt FS?

What if: no ~~Kerry~~, or close equivalent?  
(see Carter: "Mael"?)

(But legend candidate: or Power; or Reverend  
(Not Hollywood H)



My horror at GEOP, alt. Chernobyl:

cities

China

Moscow

loss control (2-man, delegation,  
shrink, envelope,  
no-PAL (Came 1958  
before Agnus '60)  
unreliable C<sup>3</sup> (EAMs)

(not so much, FS plan, though fragmentation  
+ lossiness  
+ false alarm  
(analogist)

NOT: fallout! → 600M

(not just, cities)

Now, of course, smoke from cities

(or even, fire: I don't  
know that!)

// Conclusion: cities could be separated  
from mil. targets (fallout from ground  
bursts; long CEPs

Regret: loss control (TCS/MHO), centering on  
ICBM, MIRV, testing of warheads, missiles  
(therefore, no "test" for large forces -

Expend: for reliable FS, with  
unreliable & inaccurate missiles, bombers  
unreliable

large CEP's -

as in WWII (result: city pop &

cities being "collateral" ("bonus") damage  
in any case I look of PLYWD, 1997 !!

but, with  
fallout,  
+ large gravel



(99) PL & WFO — (almost) no hard targets  
in 3rd world! end of CW!

Saddam? did he leave? How  
many? Argue close — told from?  
(BW? a real (Bosnian) threat  
"and for FU"

Cong. Herrington? geography: lots from with multiple ones!

(Cor: "World lost US credibility" (!?)  
world)

World come together."

(No mention - World hall & provisions.)

20 years — 1945/45 — of strategic others  
with "reluctant little" exhausted ritual

on US — less than ~~50~~ some (80) / that

had suffered in WWII [in reality — any — any?  
none]

(of measured — so would we

CR — with cheap performance

OTW — Vs. On the Beach

(same year! ? 1960?)

If didn't say that!

and SAC (80000 would)

{ opinion  
{ all }

not, "O"

(ignoring Europe)

— predicted 10M deaths

despite wanting US FS

So we had a SKINSON OPTION was plan

NOT HAVE TAC NUC FOR EUROPE — and E no (was) alternative



12-5-13

What if more of SU has been realistic?



6-23-16

W/ wasn't it's threat to Europe  
with his ~~to~~ have nukes, MRBMs, IABMs  
holding Europe & UK hostage

more than enough to eliminate  
NATO EU strategy

(even, deployment of the  
nukes to Europe)

(get see by Richardson & P-)

(

and to get Berlin — walk in ?

Pro: Because ~~US~~ NATO <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ crucial — essential?

NO — because US didn't commit  
EU commitments —

After, was likely to see to EU  
(the)

and even JFK (who wasn't!

(because of 100)

talked and acted US only

as if he was

+ K saw this

and Gov. saw that he saw this

(so they could accept a degree of  
commitment to a definite action

which — if it failed to deliver & was convinced out —



would lead to the annihilation.

If US (H/K/VER/LBJ/N) did want  
 E in case, how could they "squeeze"  
 into a straight form" into Europe  
 to accept a US guarantee of FU  
 (not a bluff)

Valéry d'Estaing (google) was bluffing  
 (+ somewhat, later)

Were other French NOT bluffing?

How is the difference from injure?

(If they commit certain it would would?)

Bargaining with the threat of annihilation

Why are threats usually costly to carry out?

1-2. irrational

unless 2) is a dynamic game

Mafia (rob, honor, withdrawal  
 alliances, subject people...

or (if they have would then - out of control  
 - or, rational,  
 optimal

Threat

"delusion";

problem

Answer: Because would is non-zero-sum;

My utility / rewards are not determined

by another game - that's usually costly for me

It can do better (be myself) with the resources, choice involved  
 in how to POV



Problem of threaten / coerce —

How do I make it sufficiently credible  
that if you don't do what I want (conveying  
to you proof is absent of, & prior to, by threat!

\* when this depends on what I'm demanding  
of you, what that will mean to you  
(if you comply) and what I'm threatening  
to do to (harm) you will be

Compared to what it would  
be if you didn't comply (and I accepted  
this: state goes prior to threat)

that I will become "irrational" for me —

NON-OPTIMALLY is turn of my options  
is absence of threat

(though I may have made it optimal,  
just in case of threat-compliance  
or I may pretend it is optimal,  
convincingly (how?)

or even "madly, irrationally" — self-destructively  
[is this always  
irrational?] ]

with or without mutual destruction



Consistent threat of  
directed (efforts of) semi-~~con~~ DM vs SO/R  
partial omniscience (to US)  
(appraisal?)

could be made to back with option,  
or "possibly optimal"  
for me,  
Blessing

or "none"

(things possible a result of

1) - giving up control

(e.g. to HK's "DM")

or delegation to <sup>total</sup> abstract  
involutes out of commission  
after commitment

[~~Exp~~ 2 Nov 1914

6 in 1940, order

Blessing

SAC GO order

C-I delegation

confidential to any other  
antenna left (perhaps) one:

- Buffing a superior attack

or, except

(non-covering;  
all-out)

a sufficient probe (beyond the critical  
risk) of big attack is US & SO/R

(We'll use with, on certainty of SO (to US) PS  
does not make assumption of total "none"  
<sup>total</sup> apprise



(though it may be cost-free, too  
(unless SU has decided on  
attack before we reach threshold  
(which warning can't tell you -  
or even SU attack, right now)

(N-Workbooks? ~~the~~  
all very small, accurate?  
limited numbers...  
not come enough for -  
UNLESS WE RETAL. BIG  
(Now do this!)

---

Chung's 1% rule -  
if applied to a catastrophe  
that on ~~adherent~~ threshold to come  
out if ... no persistent  
"We must comply."

~~COB~~

Wf didn't  
he?  
He did make  
threshold, after 9-11,  
that he couldn't  
come out:

Ch OBL said - "9-11 unless you  
get out of Saudi Arabia" (i)  
Hitler's threat to Jews in Jan '39:

Did Chung attack 1% to ~~Chung's~~  
warnings, or ~~Chung's~~?



When did TCS write

- I think that Name belongs to Chen?

- Responded from

Before or after late summer 1958?

my session

TR

What did HAK say about on August?

Harrison Salisbury

- New Yorker

- His Name They

Dallas - Brinkman (book)

or 67?  
1968

April in

1969

Can Wolfer on Annual Events!



6-23-16  
11:55 PM

after WWII - no world wars  
no "world"

for ... 1000 years?  
2000?

no Empire

no cities, for how long?

Stability

Balance of Power

was not delicate in 1958-62

in terms of possible SU FS

on promotion

US Type I - sobriety

not possible

from 1950-64

(not after: thanks to

(like Britain  
2.0-)

USSR, RAND, etc, JFK,

like Nixon

USCIB ... Khrushchev ... C-II

Bomb

1943-45

But SU Type I was

What if they

delicate! very threatened

know of MP?!

Created

Berlin; C-II (DUS)

possible

K wanted détente, disarmament (like Hushenko)

being - not

CTB; (NEU?)

response

+ CP trying

But his bluffs were <sup>BOASTS</sup> diversion

abolition?

(few weaknesses!)

Berlin gaps; ICBM; nuclear threats; <sup>Stalin</sup> (Berlin blockade 1948) Spirit

including Berlin

U-2 shoot-down; Berlin Ultimatum 1958-62

(Long? Khrushchev?) C-I, C-II Hungary; Czech; Poland

"wars of NO"; we will buy you; shoe (Castro)



2:02 PM

Friday, February 6, 2015  
TR-DE talk.

Did Stalin or successors ever plan to take over West Europe?

Only in blitzkrieg planning of late Sixties, in response to flexible response (!!! NATO's fear of McNamara!): when it seemed possible that there would be no nuclear response, or it would be delayed, or subject to political decision. They built up to exploit this opportunity; which they foresaw only in response to a war started by Europe. BUT that might have been provoked by an uprising in East Europe, joined by national forces, followed by Western intervention.

TR.SU had a domino theory, that if any particular member of Warsaw pact withdrew from the Pact, it could have a cascading domino effect (especially if it included East Germany. In effect, this did happen. Romania did withdraw. (Earlier, Tito). Albania had independent policy.

But in uprisings, the issue of leaving the Pact did arise: Hungary; Czechoslovakia? Poland, 1956, 1980? Brezhnev: If any tries to leave, that will be put down by SU forces.

SU Fear of WWII, and spirit of German revenge (revanchist: revenge defeat/humiliation and restore lost territories. (French, after Franco-Prussian War; Germany after WWI; Stalin fear of German revanchism after WWII. (exaggerated fear of actual German attitudes.)

Russia had reason to fear independent right-wing regimes in East Europe, a channel for German attack again (note Napoleon, as well as WWI and WWII), and for Western incursions against USSR (see Wisner insurgent forces in East Europe, Albania, which Russians knew about through Philby and others.)

And that's true today! To some degree, more unstable today: shifting borders, shifting NATO. (Scholars today in international relations are ignoring how close US and SU came to war in last century; and now).

The analogy of Putin in eastern Ukraine to Hitler and the Sudetenland (Hillary) have been basis. Reclaiming lost territory. Putin is supporting proxy war (unlike Hitler). Putin is not Hitler.

US inclined to support and supply arms to Ukraine: possible US/R conflict over Ukraine, in context of expansion of NATO. (Does US show any openness to a non-aligned Ukraine, not part of NATO? Not apparently.



Wallerstein thinks Merkel is inclined to cut a deal with Putin after the election. What the US is concerned about is an alliance between Germany, France and Russia. Putin wants a Eurasian alliance vs. Atlanticist division (combining best of both worlds of fascism and communism (!)).

[Shanghai Cooperation Organization, about 2000, started by Russia to minimize US hegemony and power by independent ties of trade and energy, independent of US.

Now US is dominant in alliance both in Asia and Europe;  
If Germany, France and Moscow develop closer relations together (Putin may want to break up the European Union, have countries France, Germany cooperate with Russia rather than the US;

Baltics want permanent NATO military presence in the Baltics, bases. TR bets Ukraine and the east NATO countries want NATO commitment,

Escalatory arms race is possible: SDI in Poland, Czechoslovakia, training exercises.

Prospect of armed conflict between Russia/rebels and US/NATO/Ukraine.

Dollar auction: where will it stop? When will Putin say, "This must stop"? (erosion of USSR, which has not necessarily stopped).

Coompare: Khrushchev's threats when he was at a military disadvantage compared to US. It didn't work for Khrushchev, but he believed for a time that they were effective. (Bluffs).

Russia is working with forces in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, but how much control do they have over them?

Pivot of what Timothy Snyder called "The Bloodlands": Ukraine.

Russians feel they are faced with another loss, in Ukraine: (West exploited popular unrest in western Ukraine against Russian-aligned government).

Question of relative influence over Germany, now allied with US and European Union (Nuland: Fuck the EU (not, fuck Russia: US interests first, vs. EU, a more aggressive US policy rather than a cautious, neutral approach.

Before WWI, part of Ukraine in Austro-Hungarian Empire, (and parts of what later became Romania; now parts of Romania are part of contemporary Ukraine):  
After WWI, Ukraine became part of USSR (Austro-Hungarian Empire fell apart; part of Ukraine became Romania in 1919; now back in Ukraine). (Russia went into Ukraine during Civil War).



US has a more aggressive position regarding Ukraine than does Germany or EU (and tapping Merkel's phone didn't help). A US-oriented Ukraine gives US more influence over EU and Germany. (Putin speaks German; Merkel speaks Russian.)

Wallerstein: widespread belief in Russia about a US conspiracy to drive down oil prices, weaken Russia.

TR: (If you look at the situation before WWI and today, you see a similar unwillingness of the dominant powers controlling the system to consider the security concerns of the other Great Powers. (UK and France not willing to take into account security considerations of Germany but especially Austria-Hungary). (Austrian fear of erosion because of Serbia, and unconcern by Germany; in fear of losing more and more. In that concern, they take gambles that end up catastrophically, but could stave off loss.)

(Germany concerned that if they waited until 1917 when Russians built up, with French help, they would be as outnumbered on land as they were at sea. And also concerned to address concerns of Austria-Hungary. So "better war now than later." Better to risk a gamble now, than to see additional losses. (See Snyder in latest IS).



Thursday, April 14, 16  
5:43 PM

[? My understanding of Thirties and WWII wasn't bad. WWI mysterious, then and still.]

[I.e., my understanding of events, retrospectively or even at the time, from birth to 15 was good enough. (Even, A-bomb, contrary to other Americans!) My misinformation starts when I started to become politically interested and "informed." That's when (especially after Czech coup in early 1948, rejection of marshall plan by soviets, Berlin blockade; finally, Korea) started to believe the presidential and government line (abandoning Harry's radical understanding! Which saw SU moves as defensive! Saw Greek civil war as counter-revolutionary on our side: Truman Doctrine. I saw him as biased—he was—and "apologetic" for Stalin. Yet he was more right than the Cold War line I absorbed. Whether Hiss was a Communist—or Oppenheimer!—I still don't know.]

As true for other Americans. Most until today ! What does this say about what "most Americans," (including young, or not? Most? As in Vietnam!—most believed USG line, didn't oppose.)

**I had no idea then (or in most cases, until this spring, up to 70 years later!)**

--Real reasons for Hiroshima and Nagasaki (non-) "decisions." (A clue from Hammond on Hiroshima, 1960? Gar Alperovitz, 1965. (Did I read this before going to Vietnam? Or long after? As I did Scheer on reasons for Vietnam.) (LATEST, just last two days! To keep SU out of occupation of Japan, and surrender negotiations!)

--Why Japan surrendered. (Just tonight: Rhodes convinced by Hasegawa; SU entry: see file tonight on Hiroshima, under Carey Files)

--TONIGHT: 4/14/16 11:00 PM: The NEED to justify Hiroshima, and the EFFECTS (SOUGHT AND ACHIEVED\_by the official justification: a) less (what I supposed until now) to protect officials like Truman, Stimson, Conant, from condemnation, incrimination (risked newly by Hersey's Hiroshima in 1946), or (b) to conceal the real motives, precursor to Cold War, influence on relations with SU; but both aim and effect, especially in Conant's mind in 1946, stimulating and editing the Stimson/Bundy article that set the history for ever since: to avoid American public rejection of the nuclear first-use policy underlying the forthcoming (in their minds) Cold War and NATO. The Bomb had to be seen as potentially justifiable, especially as threat (unlike Japan use), and crucially effective and essential in its one, transcendent use, its "success" in ending WWII and saving a million US lives, and Japanese too, an unequivocal "necessary," lesser-evil use in its one historical precedent, thus a clear potential (even, presumption of legitimate use in hands of American president: need for monopoly or superiority). Conant feared not so much



recriminations over past but refusal to use it (and diminished effectiveness of threatening it, credibility, readiness to use, expectation by adversary) in future, looking forward! (In other words, Stimson article was primarily an instrument in the new Cold war, more than a retrospective justification of use in the last war.) THEY did NOT want Hiroshima/Nagasaki to be the **last** use of the atom bomb (which Conant saw as a necessary complement to, though not a substitute for, conventional force in Europe—as when he became High commissioner in Germany!-). Ironically, he did NOT see the H-bomb as necessary in this role (he may even have underestimated the political costs, at home and abroad, of not being first with H-bomb, though he was right it was not needed for military purposes, at least Type I deterrence. H was relevant to Type II! Conant seems to have overlooked this in 1949, along with Oppenheimer (who counted on tac nucs). But maybe they both saw it in terms of the Teller-Ulam design; it may explain why they abandoned their resistance (not just for reasons of political inevitability, or new feasibility: after all, if the Teller-Ulam design was still “an evil thing in itself, “ a greater evil, then feasibility wouldn’t make it better. But perhaps Fermi and Rabi saw the Teller Super as necessarily evil, nothing but evil, in no way “necessary,” and capable ONLY of massively genocidal use, necessarily huge and even unlimited. Maybe they really weren’t so opposed to the Teller-Ulam design, despite its being ominous in itself (like their A-bomb: ominous, but supposedly, and plausible, useful if not necessary.)

--US desire to lock Western Europe into US economic sphere, “system”: as motive for rearming Germany, Marshall Plan, NATO.

--Concern of US and West Europe about German resurgence and aggression and independence, not only about Soviet influence and possible incursions. (Czech coup, followed by Berlin blockade, overshadowed the otherwise-obvious reason to be apprehensive about Germans; a “prejudice” of the French (and British, etc.)

--US/French/UK desire for a (West) German state (secret talks in early 1948, combining of zones, then new Deutschmark, threatening viability of East Berlin: as background and provocation to Berlin blockade). (First postwar US nuclear FU threat, if not counting Truman/Iran in 1946). (This is clear precursor to US nuclear FU threat as foundation of NATO, especially after Korea—and failure of Lisbon goals.)

--Secret desire for West German rearmament, as key to economic recovery of Germany (after Marshall Plan expires in spring 1952) and of West Europe, within US sphere (not independent, neutral, negotiating with and “accommodating to” SU and trading with SU.

--This as severe provocation to SU: probably not remotely feasible without US nuclear monopoly at the time. Likewise, maintaining status of West Berlin (US/French/UK occupation) inside East Germany.



Two largely unrecognized achievements of US atomic diplomacy, otherwise unattainable. (Like, maintaining south Vietnam, 1956-60, deterring NVN offensive down the coast). (And perhaps, according to Truman, getting SU out of Azerbaijan. Or were there other factors in 1946? SU desire for rapprochement, good relations, aid?)

--Degree of concern, and justification for it, by Soviets about Germany (This would have seemed obvious, except for above); and the influence this had shaping SU policy: need both for buffer zone and for harsh control of it (especially given US/UK plans to rearm Germany).

--All this (especially after Czech coup and Berlin blockade) as underpinning for Cold War.

--NATO as aimed primarily at controlling West Europe (not "protecting" it from SU militarily). Keeping it in US economic sphere, rather than negotiating/trading with SU or being "neutral," independent, possibly forming a bloc excluding the US.

--And in particular, NATO being aimed at controlling West Germany (while keeping Germany divided, East under tight, and repulsive, SU control: better than a united Germany not in NATO).

--MIC aim of selling weapons to NATO Europe (AS IN LAST 15 YEARS OF EXPANSION!)—financed by USG spending.

--Soviet fear of a nuclear-armed Germany; relation of this to Soviet pressure on Berlin, **Berlin crisis 1958-62**. (Ulam, Trachtenberg, TR). (Steinbruner cites German Starfighters with nuclear weapons aboard as of 1960; AE Committee finds this in 1960, but holds secret; Steinbruner

--Prior to C-I: JFK support of that; but after that, JFK/RFK determination on regime change in Cuba. And Khrushchev and Castro correct belief in this.

--Mongoose (EGL! RFK! (no hint of this in my relations with EGL 1965-67, RFK 1967-68; or until Church committee, 1975-76).

--US invasion plans, exercises, Northwoods (!). (Despite my seeing updated plans in June, 1961. I thought they were half-assed, as they were; yet directed by JFK, puzzlingly!)

--These as key motives for Cuban Missile Crisis, C-II! (not recognized by "experts" outside DDP (not known even to DDI! Or half of ExComm) until 1975/1989 (Hershberg)/1991-92! Or by me, in 1964-75 (despite relationship with EGL and RFK), despite SI, T, K, I clearances in 1964!



--US regime change in Iran; Guatemala (until Wise and Ross, Invisible Government, Jan. 1964: mentions Special Group (5812? 303? 40) (start of my nuclear crisis study)

--Kennan and Bohlen alternative view of SU as defensive and reactive, capable of political and economic containment, not threat to West Europe; possibilities of unified and disarmed and neutral Germany (opposed by Truman/Nitze/Acheson team] Kennan on NFU. (I first heard this view, I think, from Dick Barnet in Cambridge, 1971, just before PP came out).

[Note what I didn't know even as a high-level consultant and official Insider, with high clearances! Like other Insiders! See Ideology II (elaboration of NC on ideology).

{On SI: TG as an example of SI being not only misinterpreted, but deliberately distorted, and used to deceive.

C-II "attack" on Banes site (NST history still wrong): example of misinterpretation of SI (yet, paradoxically, suggesting a right result, when no other Insiders at the time got it right: SAM not fired by K orders. Even K didn't know what had happened! Or Castro! (False Cuban rumors, probably sincere.)

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